This book offers a new approach to the theory of argumentation that conceptualizes argumentation as a fundamentally ethical activity whose norms are grounded in, and must be selected according to, moral reasons.
Current normative approaches to argumentation do not treat ethics as an integral part of argumentation theory. This is at least in part due to a methodological commitment not to address internal states of the arguers, such as intentions and beliefs, which makes moral theorizing about argumentation difficult. This book presents three arguments for why ethics ought to be a central element in normative theorizing about argumentation. Through these arguments it shows, first, that ethics is needed for providing normative argumentation theory with its foundation and for offering arguers reliable guidance for decision- making, both about which norms ought to govern their arguing and how they should shape each argument they make. Second, it addresses some of the most persistent problems faced by currently dominant normative approaches to argumentation, most notably that they are only reliable under the assumption that unrealistic background conditions are fulfilled. Finally, it provides the groundwork for a systematic ethics of argumentation. It does so by showing how a function of argumentation can be justified via moral reasons and by providing the outlines for both an applied ethics of (meta- level) normative argument design and an applied role-ethics of object-level arguing.
The Ethics of Argumentation is essential reading for researchers and graduate students in a wide range of disciplines- including philosophy, communication studies, linguistics, and rhetoric- who are interested in communication, deliberation, argumentation, critical thinking, and social epistemology.
